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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY, a niunicipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff and
A ppella;nt,

vs
CLYDE C. PATTERSON,
Defenda.nt and
Respondent

STATE1MENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by the Appellant Ogden
City seeking a declaratory judgment declaring, first,
that no office foi a second judge of the Ogden City Court
and ex-officio justice of the peace presently exists under
Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, and, second, that even
if such office exists the defendant is not legally elected
thereto and entitled to hold the office and receive the
emoluments.
Appellant appeals from an adverse judgment on
both issues.
There is, we believe, no dispute on the facts. They
are set out in the Findings of Fact as amended. (R 013
to 021).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendant is an attorney possessing all qualifications to entitle him to aspire to office as a judge of
the City Court of Ogden City. (R 013.)
The population of Ogden City as determined by
the official United States Census for 1940 was, at the
date of that census, 43,688. (R 014.)
On April 2, 1950, the U. S. Bureau of the Census,
pursuant to Federal law to take the 1950 census, including an official census of Ogden City. In accord with
Federal law the returns reflecting the count of the population of Ogden City were forwarded to the District
Supervisor, and the enumeration was in due course
forwarded to the Director of the Census at Washington.
(R 014.)
Under Federal law the enumeration was taken as
of April 1st, and returns sent to the supervisor within
30 days of April 2nd. (13 U. S. C. A. 206). The tabulation of total population by states was required to be
completed by December 2, 1950. (13 U. S. C. A. 202).
On or about June 14, 1950, the District Supervisor
of the Census at Ogden by letter addressed to the Mayor
of Ogden, in form illustrated by Exhibit C, advised the
Mayor that a preliminary count showed Ogden's population as of April 1, 1950, at 56,908. (R 030-031.)
On August 25, 1950, the Director of the Census,
pursuant to the provisions of 13 U. S. C. A. 4 and 213,
issued a preliminary bulletin and report announcing,
subject to later revision, the result of a preliminary
count of the Census returns of the population of Ogden
2
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and other places in Utah. That. bulletin 8tated that the
population of Ogden on April1, 1950, was 56,910. (R 014,
Exhibit B.)
On March 8, 1951, the Legislature passed the Bill
appearing· as Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, which
became effertiYe ~fay 8,1951. By Section 104-4-2 of the
Judicial Code, as amended by that law, it is provided
that at the 1951 ~Iunicipal Election and thereafter city
judges shall be elected as follows : ''In cities having
a population, as determined by the next official census
and each official census thereafter of 50,000 and less
than 100,000 there shall be two city judges;" in cities
with a larg·er population 3 or 4 judges ; ''and in other
cities having a city court there shall he one city judge .. ''
Ogden, of course, then had one city judge. (Section
20-4-2, U. C. A. 1943, as amended hy Chapter 35, Session Laws of Utah, 1943.)
Then, on June 17, 1951, the Director of the Census
issued his final bulletin and report on the population
of Ogden on April 1, 1950. By that report the population was shown to be 57,112. (R 014, Exhibit B.).
On July 31, 1951, the defendant filed with the Ogden
City Recorder a de-claration of his candidacy for the
office of Judge of the Ogden City Court "created by
Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951," supported by the required petition of one hundred voters. (R 002, paragraph 7; **6; 010, paragraph 6; 014-5.)
At about the same time several other judicial candidates filed for the office of City Judge then held hy the
incumbent. This office the Recorder designated as Judge
·~
,)
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of the First Division; the office sought by defendant
was designated as Judge of the Second Division of the
City Court. (R 015.)
On August 7, 1951, no other candidate for Judge
of the Second Division having filed within the statutory
time limit, the defendant, pursuant to Section 1 of the
Judicial Code as enacted by Chapter 26, Laws of 1951,
demanded and received of the City Recorder a certificate of election to the office of Judge of the Second Division. (R 015; 003, paragraph 10; 008; 010, paragraph
6.)
The Municipal Election was held on November 6,
1951, but at that election the only judicial selection
ballot submitted to the electors was the ballot for election of a judge to Department No. 1 of the City Court.
No ballot for election of a judge of Division No. 2 was
ever submitted to the electors, and defendant's name
was never submitted to the voters at any election or on
any ballot. (R 019-20; 015-16.)
On December 4, 1951, the Council of Ogden City,
feeling that there was no need for a second judge, as
the court seemed able to keep its work current with one
judge, took the position that they would, as an economy
measure, refuse to create the second job if that was
legally possible ( R 025-6, Exhibt A), and directed a
letter to defendant inviting him to present his point of
VleW. (Ibid.)
On December 27th, after hearing Mr. Patterson,
the Council defeated a motion to strike the salary of
-!
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the second judge from the proposed budget, but unanimously passed a motion directing the institution of
this action for a declaratory judgment to settle the legal
problems involYed. (Ibid.)
On December 31, 1951, the Council adopted the proposed budget, '"'hich included an item of $5,000.00 as
salary for the second judge. (R 028-9.) On the same
day the defendant presented to the Recorder his oath
as judge of the disputed Division No. Two, and the
Recorder accepted and filled it. (R 029.)
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

1. By the terms of Section 104-4-2 of the Judicial
Code, as amended, there is no presently existing offiee
of city judge or ex-offieio justice of the peace of Department No. Two of the Ogden City Court.
2. Even if such office exists, the defendant is not
legally elected or appointed to such office and has no
right thereto.
A. A judge of the city court is ex-officio a precinct
justice of the peace and no one may hold such
office except by election on secret ballot by the
electors of the city.
(1) The office of justice of the peace is an elective constitutional office under Constitution of
Utah, Article VIII, Sections 1 and 8.
(2) Under Constitution of Utah, Article IV,
Sections 2 and 8, the provision for election
without secret ballot by the city electors is
unconstitutional and void.
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B. The office of judge of a city court is an elective
office and the defendant, not having been elected
thereto by secret ballot of the electors, has no
valid claim to such office.
C. Defendant has no valid claim to the office of
judge of the city court as by an appointment.
( 1) The filing of an unopposed declaration and
petition for candidacy for such office cannot
be deemed a valid appointment thereto, as new
Section 1 of the Judicial Code as enacted by
Section 2, Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, is
void for violation of the Constitution of Utah,
Article V, Section 1, and Article VI, Section 29.
( 2) Such office can he filled in the first instance
only by appointment by the Mayor with the
consent of the City Council, and defendant
holds no such appointment.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. By the terms of Section 104-4-2 of the
Judicial Code, as amended, there is no presently existing office of city judge or ex-officio justice of the peace
of Department No. Two of the Ogden City Court.
Whether or not the office claimed by defendant has
legal existence depends upon the interpretation of the
language the Legislature used in Section 104-4-2 of the
Judicial Code, as amended. The key phrase, as appelhint sees it, is the following:
''In cities having a population, as determined by
the next official census and each official census
thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100 000 there

'

6
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shall be t"To city judges; .... and in other cities
haYing a city court there shall be one city judge.''
(Italics added.)
It is submitted that under this provision Ogden
City has only one city judge until it appears by an official census taken subseqne,nt to May 8, 1951, (the effeetive date of the Act) that Ogden City has a. population
between 50,000 and 100,000. It is not enough that by an
official census taken prior to May 8, 1951, the city had
a population in excess of 50,000.
In the interpretation of this statute it must he considered that therer are at most only three possible meanings of the phrase ''population as determined by .....
census. ' ' They are :
1. The actual number of people living In the
city;
2. The actual number of people listed on the
enumeration sheets of the census; and
3. The official announcement by an office-r or
employee of the Census Bureau of the count of the
number of names listed on the census sheets.
It is very apparent that the Legislature was not
referring to the actual population, first, because such
an interpretation would make the reference to the official census meaningless, and, second, because as a practical rna tter determination of actual population is an
almost impossible task.
It is the city's position that the second alternative,
namely, the number of people listed on the census enu-

7
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meration sheets is the correct one and it is submitted
that this position is supported by reason and the cases
hereinafter referred to.
In the court below the respondent chose the third
alternative. However, it is submitted that this alternative does violence to the language used by the Legislature and adherence to that alternative would amount
to judicial legislation.
It is, of course, fundamental that in construing a
statute an attempt must be made to arrive at the intention of the Legislature. That intention is to be derived
from the words and language used in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. The general rule is that the
words used by the Legislature must be interpreted in
their ordinary acceptation and significanee and the
meaning commonly attributed to them. 50 Am. Jur. ''Statutes''
Section 28, Note 17, Page 228 ;
Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission
93 Utah 219; 72 Pac. 2nd 467;
113 A. L. R. 1174;
Nephi Plaster and Manufacturing
Company vs. Juab County
33 Utah 114; 93 Pac. 53;
14 A. L. R. (NS) 1043.
Also, ''words in common use are to be given their
natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning."
59 C. J. 975, Note 20;
In re, Thompson's Estate
72 Utah 17; 269 Pac. 103;
8
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State YS. Hendrirkson
57 lTtah 15; 24:5 Pac. 375;
57 A. L. R. 786;
c~arhe

. .\.uto Company vs.
Central Garage
63 Utah 10; 221 Pac. 862;
30 ..c-\. L. R. 1217.

The Legislature also has spoken on this subject:
"Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage
of the language . . . . "
Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
(Italics added).
What then is the meaning of the keys words used
by the Leg-islature~ Let us consider each of them in
its natural, plan ordinary and commonly understood
meaning.
First, what is a census u?
The Federal Census is taken pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution of the United States. Article
I, Section 2 provides that representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several states
according to their respective "numbers" and that "The
actual enumeration shall he made within three years
after the first meeting of the Congress of the United
States'' and every ten years thereafter. Article I, Section 9 of the Federal Constitution provides that no direct
tax shall be laid ''unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration hereinbefor edirected to be taken.'' There
9
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1s no other reference to the census and the Federal
laws do not define a census. Apparently the drafters
of the Constitution used the word census as the equivalent of the word enumeration.
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines a census as :
''An official enumeration of the population
of a country or a city or other administrative
district, generally with classified information
relating to social and economic conditions.''
The same work defines ''enumeration'', in the sense in
which it is obviously used in the abo~e definition, as
"An itemized list or catalog; a census."
The California Court in
City of Compton vs. Adams
203 Pac. 2nd 745, 746,
says that:
''A census is an official enumeration of the
population of . . . . . a city. "
Again in the case of
Holcomb vs. Spike
232 s. w. 891,
decided by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 1n 1921,
it is said:
''A census must be an official enumeration
of the people, and as such a public record containing not merely a sum total, but an official list
of the names of a.Zl inhabitants . .. "

10
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And

ag~ain

in the rase vf

State Ys. Wooten
1~~ S. \\T. 1101, 1103,
it is said that:
4

'.A. census of a city is an official enumeration
of the inhabitants with details of sex, age and
family. It is a public document to be preserved
in the archives of the city, rather than a mere
su,m total of the inhabitants." (Em~hasis added).
And in an Indiana case,
City of Huntington vs. Cast
48 ~. E. 1045,
it is said:

''A census is not merely a sum total, but an
offici.al list containing the names of all the inhabitants."
Again in
Lewis vs. Lackawanna County
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 25,
affirmed in 50 Atl. 162,
the court said :
"The census is the enumeration of the population, 'JtOt the announ'cement of the result.''
This definition was quoted with approval by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of
Underwood vs. Hickman
39 S. W. 2nd 1034.
It seems clear from a. reading of the Federal Statutes relating to the census that the Congress used the.
11
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term to refer to the enumeration and not to the bulletins announcing the results of the statistical survey of
the eumeration. See for example,
13 U. S. C. A., Section 206
where it is said:

''The census of the population . . . shall he
taken as of the first day of April, and it shall be
the duty of each enumerator to commence the
enumeration of his district on the day following"
The census, then, is the list of the population taken
by the en.u.merators durmg the thirty (30) days beginning April 2, 1950, and forwarded to the census super·
visors before the end of that period.
Next what is meant by the word "official" as used
in referring to the census~
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines the word in the following terms :
''Of or pertaining to an office, position or
trust; connected with holding an office; as official duties or routine.
''Derived from the proper office or officer,
or from proper authority; made or communicated by virtue of authority; authorized; authoritative; as, an official statement.
''Prescribed or recognized as authorized, as,
an official ballot.''
See also:
Gunsul vs. Ray
45 P ac. 2nd 248, 249,

12
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decided by the California ...:\.ppellate Court.
It is apparent that the 'Yord "official" as used in
the statute refers to a cellsus taken. by a public officer
'l~tnder authority of law.
It might he either a census
taken by Federal officers or by state or city officers,
so long it is authorized by law.
We come then to a consideration of the word ''next'',
which may 'vell be the crux of the matter when used as
a modifier of the term ''census'' in the statute in question. The word ''next'' has several meanings and the
meaning to be ascribed to a particular use of the term
must be ascertained from the context. Webster defines
it as follows :
''Near est; having nothing similar intervening; as : a.. adjoining in a series ; immediately
preceding or following in order . . .
"b. Following that approaching (as a season),
or in progres s (as a piece of work) ; as, I cannot
go this Christmas, but I hope to go next (Christmas)."

The definition of the term as an adverb also sheds some
light upon its ordinary meaning. Webster gives this
definiton:
'' 1. In the time, place or order nearest or immediately succeeding; as, next w-e drove home ; ..
''On the first occasion to come; as, when when
we meet.''
It is apparent that in the ordinarily accepted meaning of the 'vord "next," when used without some other
qualifying term, means the next hereafter or the
next succeeding. In ordinary conversation referring
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to events occurTing in a series the use of the word "next"
to refer to the last preceding event is practically unknown. When the ordinary person speaking English
says ''next day'' he does not mean yesterday, he means
tomorrow, unless he qualifies next by saying ''next
preceding.'' ''Next'' used alone and without qualifiers
in ordinary usage refers to the future and not to the
past as indicated by the quoted definitions.
The cases in which the problem has been considered
in a situation like this are in accord:
"Next" means that which comes after.
Sandy vs. Thomas
66 S. W. 2nd 449.
''Next'' means subsequent.
Osborn vs. Rogers
19 N. J. Equity 429.
''Next'' means nearest immediately following.
In re Park
8 Fed 2nd 544.
See also the case of
Palka vs. Walker
124 Conn. 121,
198 Atl. 265.
There, under a constitutional provision giVIng the
governor power to grant reprieves after a criminal conviction until the end of the ''next'' session of the General Assembly and no longer, it was held that the word
''next'' did not refer to a session of the Assembly in
existence whe~n the reprieve is granted, but referred to
the session which begins thereafter.
14
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See also the case of
State ex rel. Brunjes
Ys. Bockelman.
240 s. w. 209,
hereafter more fullv•. discussed .
If then the Legislature had intended the census of
April 1, 1950, to be the criterion for the classification
of cities as to the number of city court judges, it would
normally have said :
''As determined hy the last preceding official
census and each official census thereafter.''
It did not do so.
As will appear later in this brief, many legislatures
have taken that natural and easy step when referring
to a census taken prior to the effective date of the law
and it certainly should not he presumed that the Legislature turned its back upon these precedents and
used a different word without intending a different
meaning.
The Legislature, if it intended the act to be immediately effective, could have said with equal ease and
definiteness that the classification of the city should
be ''determined by the United States Decennial Census
for the year 1950, and by each official census thereafter." It did not do so. It chose to use the phras·e
"next official census." It must then have intended a
different meaning by the use of the different term. The
Legislature knew when it sat that the census for 1950
had been completed. The fact that Ogden City, which
is the only city within the population range _specified,
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had a population of approximately 57,000 as determined
by that census was a matter of common knowledge.
Official notice thereof had been given by the preliminary
announcements of the District Supervisor and the Director of the Census himself issued many months before
the Legislature convened. When it used the term
''next'' under these circumstances it could not, it is
submitted, have referred to anything except a census
in which the enumeration should be taken after the
effective date of the law on May 8, 1951.
If the query be raised as to why the word "next"
was used inste~d of the phrase ''United States Decennial
Census for 1960 and each official census thereafter,''
the answer is obvious: There may be other official
censuses between 1\{ay 8, 1951 and the decennial census
of 1960. The Legislature intended that the next official census after May 8, 1951, should establish the
class. The Constitution of Utah itself provides for an
official state census to be taken in 1905 and and every
tenth year thereafter, and although such census has not
been taken in the past it is not to be presumed that it
'viii not be taken in 1955, especially in the light of the
agitation for a re-apportionment of State Senators
and Representatives. It is a general rule of law that
public officers 'vill be presumed to perform their official duties.
Moreover, there may he other official censuses than
the state and Federal Decennial censuses. See.
City of Compton vs. Adams
203 Pac. 2nd 745,
decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1949.

16
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See also section 15-8-68, U. C.A. 1943, authorizing
the city itself to provide for a census.
It is submitted then that under the generally accepted meaning of the 'vords used, the phrase ''next
official census" as used by the Legisl~.tur,e refers to
an enumeration of the population taken by a public
official under authority of law at a time subsequent. to
~Iay 8, 1951. It does not and cannot refer to the report
of the final audit of the population of Ogden issued
on June 17, 1951.
Such is the decision in the only case directly 1n
point which the plaintiff has been able to find by ·a
prolonged and diligent search. The case is
State ex rel. Brunjes
vs. Bockelman
240 S. W. 209,
decided by the 1Iissouri Court. In that case a statute passed in 1919 and approved Ma,y 27, 1919, provided
that "on and after the first day· of January~ 1921, the
prosecuting attorney shall receive for his· -services''
certain specified sums graduated according to the population of the county in vvhich he served._. The statue
further provided that:
''The number of inhabitants ..... shall ...
be ascertained by multiplying the whole number
of votes cast at the last preeeding presidential
election by five until after the population .· ...
shall have been ascertained by the next decenn-ial·
census of the United States."
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The court first held that under the· provision first above
quoted the statute was effective and spoke as of January
1, 1921. The 1920 census wa.s taken as of January 1,
1920. See
13 U. S. C. A., Sections
21 and 42.

The final re~sults apparently were not announced until
after that effective date. It was argued that the words
"next decennial census" of the United States used in
the act of 1919 (which became effective January 1,
1921) under these circumstances referred to the 1920
census. The court rejected this contention, saying (Page
212):
''Bearing in mind that the law became effective January 1 1921, the words 'last preceding
presidential election would mean and apply to the
election in November, 1920 and the words 'next
decennial census of the United States' would not
refer to the census taken in 1920, but to the one
to be taken in 1930. The word 'next' used in a
law passed or becoming effective in 1921, could
not refer to the census of 1920. As used in statutes of this character, the "\vord has the meaning
of 'following' or 'immediately following'. Black's
Law Dictionary, Second Ed., Page 817; State vs.
Asbell, 57 Kan. 403; 46 Pac. 770. It at least
could not refer to something that had gone before."
The plaintiff respectfully submits that this case is exactly in .point and should be followed here.
While State vs. Bockelman, supra, is the only case
the c.ity has found which is exactly in point, there are a
number of case~ ar1s1ng under the exact converse of

18
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the statutory situation, that is, in cases. where· the Legislature directed that official. a.ction be taken: depending
upon population as sho""'Il by the ''last 'r. Or'... the '. 'next
preceding'' census. The reasoning use~ by .:-~he .courts
in these cases is very helpful, for in many ~f them the
time when official action 'Yas taken fell, as here~ between
the ''preliminary'' announcement of census re~suits,
and the ''final'' announcement by the J;)ire~_tor: of the
Census.
In these cases it was held that the ~edexal Census
is complete and ''official'' not later th~ the day the
Director of the Census issues a. preliminary report on
the count of the political unit ·in question.·· By some of
the cases it is even held that the census \vhen taken
relates back to the date as of which· the enume:ta tion is
made and is effective for all ·official· purPoses from
that time.
lTnder these decisions it is very cl~ar that_tpe 1950
census was complete and official not later~ tha:n .August
25, 1950 when the ])ireC~tor's ·official bulletin . of the
preliminary count 'vas issued. As of that date, if not
earlier, the 1950 census b~came. officiaJ ~ ~i~!ory, nnd
when the Legislature, in an act tal~ing.: · e~fect nine
months later, referred to' the "next" official census it
could not possibly refer to the '' l~st'' .o~fic~ai c·ensus
"Thich 'vas already hi~~or:ra 'J.1hese cases t;heref ore give
strong support to the Bockelman ease ancl .to . the position of the city in the case at bar.
., ·~
:. ~~~- ····'?::~··· .

!

It is also interes~ting· to not~ that. man:'" _<)f these
cases hold that public' ·administrati\Te official~ ~1--e bounrl
19
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to t,ake official notice of the population as disclosed by
the Federal Census at least from the date of the issuance
of a preliminary bulletin.
-For the sake of brevity. no attempt will he made
to discuss these cases individu,ally. They are the following:
Lewis vs. Lackawanna County
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 25,.
Affirmed 50 Atl. 162;
Ervin vs. State
44 S. W. 2nd 280 (Texas);

Holcomb vs. Spiket
232 s. w. 891;

Garrett vs. Andersop.
144 S. W. 2nd 971;
Elliott vs. Sitate
1 Pac. 2nd 370 (Oklahoma);
Herndon vs. Excise Board
of Garfield County
295 Pac. 293 (Oklahoma) ;
Board of Commissioners vs.
Ma.the,ws
296 Pae. 481 (Okla., 1931) ;
Excise Board of Washita
County vs. Lowden
116 ·Pac. 2nd 700 (Oklahoma);
Carter
259 s.

v~.

Huett

w. 1057;

Kay vs. Moniteau County
134 S. W. 2nd 81 (Missouri) ;
20
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Under"~ood Y~.

39 S.

v\. .

·'Hickman
2nd 1034 . (Tennessee) ;

City of Twin Falls Ys. Koehler
123 Pac. 2nd 715 (Idaho);
State vs. DeHart
131 Pac. 2nd 156 (Washington);
State vs. Braskamp
5± N. '':· 532 (Iowa);
Puterbaugh vs. Wadman
123 Pac. 804 (California);
People YS. Wong Wang
28 Pac. 270 (California).
There are a number of cases dealing with the general
subject of the effective date of a census which neither
aid nor hamper the City's case. The respondent relied
on some of them in the court below. However, it is
submitted that all of them are distinguishable. In an
effort to be of some assistance to the eourt brief consideration will be given to these cases.
The first is the :3Iissouri case of
Varble vs. Whitecotton
190 S. vV. 2nd 244,
decided in 1945. There the manner of impanelling a
petty jury depended on the population of the co,unty
'' aceording to the last national census.'' The taking
of the 1930 census, as of April First, vvas begun April
Second. In June and ,July newspaper releases declared
the results in round numbers. In ~ ovember a jury vvas
impaneled. On Deeember T'venty-second, for the firs.t
time, a population bulletin vvas released by the Census ·
Bureau itself. It w·as held that for the purposes ·of
~1
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the statute there under consideration the census was
not in effect until December Twenty-second. It is to
he ·observed, however, that the Varble CJase differs from
the case before this court because. at the time the petty
jury was there drawn, there had not even been a preliminary bulletin issued by the Bureau of the Census,
while in the case before this court at the time Chapter
56, Laws of Utah, 1951, became effective the preliminary
official bulletin bad been issued and promulgated many
months previous thereto and in fact many months prior
to the time the Legislature convened. The Varble case
is not in point.
Another distinguishable case is
Wolfe vs. City of Moorhe,ad
107 N. W. 728,
decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1906.
That arose under a census conducted pursuant to a
state statute. ·Apparently Section 18 of the Aet specified
when the census went into legal effect for the court says:
''The census went into legal effect upon its
compilation and publication by the superintendent. 8 ection 18. ''
(Italics supplied.)
Of course, if. a statute provides 'vhen the census is effective, the statute must be followed.
The case of
Greenough vs. To,vn Council
71 Atlantic 594,
decided by Rhode Island in 1909 is not helpful because
there the critical action was taken after the fina.l returns of the census had been compiled and filed so that
no question in fact arose.
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. A. g-ain the case of

Lancaster vs. o,vensboro
- 72 S. \\T. 731 (Kentucky)
is not in point because, as is very apparent, in th:at
case the ordinance under which the city census, was
taken provided that the enumeration would not be complete until the Council disclosed the result and adopted
the work of the enumerators after it had been filed with
the Council.
Again the case of
Childers YS. DuYall
63 S. vV. 8.02,
decided by the ~'-\rkansas Court in 1901 is distinguishable.
~Ioreover, it would appear that what the court had to
say on the point here involved was obiter dicta.· In that
case the eonstitution provided that until the county
exceeded 15,000 inhabitants the circuit cle-rk should he·
ex-officio clerk of the county and probate courts, but
when the population exceeded that figure ''as sho'vn
by t4e last Federal Census'' there should be .a separate
county clerk who would be ex-officio clerk of the county
and probate courts. In Niarch, 1900, the Democratic
Party, anticipating a population of more than 15,000
nomin,ated Duvall as county clerk. The 1900 census
was taken as of June First and enume~atinn completed
before July First. On September 3, 1900, Duvall was
elooted county- clerlL On October 3, 1900, the (iensus
Director published a bulletin announcing that the population exeeeded 15,000.. On October 31, 19qD, the governor app-o1"nted Duvall to be county clerk so that it ap-;,
pears that Duvall claimed the office both by election
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and by ~appointment. Childers, the circuit clerk brought
this action to tes~t Duvall's right to the offices of clerk
of the county and probate courts.
The Arkansas court held that Duvall properly held
the office. It, of course, was unnecessary to decide
whether he held the office by virtue of his election or
by virtue of his appointment, although the court observes by way of dicta that the census was not effective
until the dir;e0tor's bulletin, as no official notice could
be taken of the results until then, and commented that
in its opinion Duvall held by virtue of the appointment
and not the election. This, however, g.eems clearly dicta
as it is entirely unnecessary to the decision. Moreover,
it might have been held that the election was void because the nomination election was held even before the
census enumeration took place, and of course, the census was not effe·ctive then. Incidentally, the cases of
Holcomb vs. Spikes and Underwood vs. Hickm~n, supra,
both distinguished the Childers case.
It is submitted that none of the caS"es relied on by
responde·nt in the court below are in point. And we
submit that there is no judicial authority contrary to
the position maintained by Ogden City in this case.
It is also interes1ting to observe that on August
1, 1950, the Attorney General of Utah officially advised the Governor of Utah that preliminary reports
issued by the Bureau of the Census may be relied upon
in issuing proclamations changing the classification of
cities. Obviously the Atrtorney General was referring
to the preliminary reports issued locally by District
Supervisors similar to that issued with re1spect to Ogden
24
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under date of June 1-!, 1930, for this 'vas some three
and one-half 'veeks ·before the Dire~tor of the C·ensu.s
had issued his preliminary report from Washington.
~Ioreover,

under date of December 26, 1950, the
Attorney General of Utah rendered his official opinion
to the State Auditor advising him that ''official actions
based upon a Federal Decennial Census need not await
the final 1950 population figures which will be published early in 1951, even though not final and expressly
subject to correction.'' Pursuant to that rule the Attorney General advised the State Auditor that the distribution to counties, cities and towns of money available
from the Liquor Control Fund under the provisions of
Chapter 112, La,vs of 1947, should he made according to
the population disclosed by the 1950 Federal ·Census.
It is very clear that all public officials of Utah were
taking official noti0e of the results of the 1950 census
even before the Legislature convened and that the Legislature must have understood that the 19-50 census had
already become a matter of p·ast history. When the
Legislature useu the phrase ''next official census'' it
therefore must have referred to a census to be taken
,. ,. subsequent to the already established 1950 census.
It has been suggested that the census should not
be held to be complete until the final announcement of
the results of the count thereof for the reason that until
the final verified count has been made and issued the
results might change and s·o present an intolerable uncertainty. Thi~ is very defin~tely not true under the
present status of the Census Law, even though it may
have been true during the past century.
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By 13 U.S.C.A., Seetion 218, it is provided that:
''The Director of the Census is authorized

rut his discretion upon the written request of the
governor of any state or territory of a court of
record, to furnish such governor or court of
record with certified copies of so much of the
population or agriculture returns as may he requesrted . . . and that the Director of the Census
i:s further authorized, in his discretion, to furnish
to individuals such data from the population
schedules as may be desired for genealogical or
other proper purposes ... and that the Director
of ,the Census is authorized to furnish transcripts
of table·s and other records and to prepare, special
statistical compilations for state or local officials,
private concerns or individuals ... ''
Under this law at any time a£ter May 1, 1950, when
the enumeration sheets of the census were completed
and filed with the District Supervisor, the city recorder
or any other interested official or person whose duties
require a. determination of the population of Ogden
could obtain a special preliminary count and certificate
from the Director of the Census to guide official action.
The fact of the population of Ogden ''as determined by
the official eensus'' was finally and forever fixed a.s
soon as the names were written down on the enumeration
sheets, and there remained only ·the purely clerical job
of counting those names. The statute 1ast quoted provides the means for settling any doubt that might exist
as to the correctness of any preliminary .announcement.
It is also 'vorthy of note that the Federal Statutes
referred to in the statement of facts require the count
to be complete not later than December 2, 1950. The

2G
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court, ":re think, "·ill take judicial notice that the total
by states is reached by adding· the totals for the· various
subdivisions and that therefore the final official report
of the population "~as required to be eompletted for the
various subdi\~isions before that time, 'vhich was more
than a month before the Legislature met to draft the
Utah la'Y in question. The Legis}ature must he presumed
not only to ha\-e the means of knowledge, but to have the
actual kno"-ledge of the fact that the 1950 eensus was
complete and official, and of the results of that census
as to the population in Ogden.
It has also been suggested that it is unreasonable
to suppose th~tt the Legislature- intended in 1951 to
pass a law which would not be effective until the taking
of the census in 1960. We submit that in the light of
legislati\e history it is reasonable to suppose that the
Legislature may sometimes be unreasonable. However,
it is not necessary to suppose that the· Legislature was
being unreasonable in making a provision in the terms
in which it did. It has already been pointed out, first,
that the Constitution of Utah requires a census in 1955,
and second, that special official censuses can he eonducted by the Bureau of the Census. Certainly the
Legislature convening in 1953 could provide for a census if it were so advised. Moreover, the City itself is
authorized by Section 15-8-68 U.C.A. 1943, to take a census, if it should desire to accelerate the effective date of
the la.w. In the third place it is submitted that it would be
even more unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature
intended immediately to saddle Ogden City with an expensive office which i~s not needed for the administration
of the city court. It appears from the minute-s of the
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Ogden City Council that it has found that a second judge
in the city court is not necessary and it must be presumed
that that finding was based upon a reasonable investiga;tion. An extra and unneeded city judge for his own
salary will cost the city $5,000 per year, to which would be
added the necessary costs for clerks and other administrative officers and the co~st of providing and maintaining the required eourt room facilities. It is submitted
that it would be unreasonable to suppose that the 1951
Legislature intended any such judicial feather bedding.
It has also been suggested that Section 104-4-3 of
the Judicial Code as amended by Chapter 26, Laws of
Utah, 1951, has a bearing upon the problem hereinbefore discussed and that by construing the two sections
together the intention of the Legi~slature to create the
office of a second city court judge in Ogden becomes
clear. Tha.t is not the case. In Section 104-4-3 it is provided that:
''Whenever it shall appear by officiul census
that any city has attained sufficient population
to place it within the class of cities for a city
eourt, or to raise it to a class entitled to have an
additional judge or judges, the mayor of such
city, with the consent of the governing body
there·of, shall a ppoinrt a city judge or judges ... ''
It is submitted that t.hi~s section adds nothing to the
one already considered. It must be observed that this
section cannot stand alone in this regard : there is no
provision in this section classifying the cities. The
classific,aton of cities for purposes of determining the
number of city court judges rests entirely upon Section 104-4-2. It must also he observed that Section
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10-!-4-3, by the reference to the ''class of cities,'' is

obYiously intended to be made dependent upon the
preceding section "'"herein the cities are classified for
that purpose.
...-\.s has already been demonstrated, the raising of a
city to a class, under the provisions of the preceding
section, does not depend upon the 1950 census but depends upon some subsequent census yet to be taken. It
is not sufficient under that seotion to show what the
population is by the 1950 census. A population in excess
of 50,000 "as determined by the next official census"
to be taken hereafter is nece~ssa.ry before Ogden will
attain that class of cities. By the terms of Section 1044-2 the 1950 census is excluded from those censuses
"'"hich are to affect the classification of cities for the
purpose involved. It follows that Section 104-4-3 has
no influence upon the interpretation of 104-4-2; the exact
contrary is the case, and Section 104-4-3 depends upon
the preceding section. The reclassification of Ogden
for the purpose of ascertaining the number of city judges cannot be effected until some census hereafter taken
shows a population of more than 50,000 and less than
100,000.

The City Council of Ogden, the governing and
policy making body of Ogden City resists the establishment of the ofiice of a second city judge for re:asons of
efficiency and economy. On reason, on the ruirect
authority nf State vs. Bockelman, supra, and on the
direct and indirect authority of the other cases and
statutes hereinbefore considered, it is submitted that
the ''next official census'' referred to by the 1951
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Legislature refers not to the 1950 census, but to a census
taken and enumerated at sometime subsequent to May
8, 1951, and that, as no such eensus has yet been taken,
there is no provision in law that Ogden City shall now
have two city court judges. It follows that the office
which the defendant claims to hold does not exi,st.
POINT 2. Even if such office exists, the defendant
is not legally elected or appointed to such office and has
no right thereto.

A. A judge of the city court is ex-officio a precinct
justice of the peace and no one may hold such
office except by election on secret ballot by the
electors of the city.
(1) The office of just,ice of the peace is an elective
constitu.tional office under Constitution of
Utah, Article VIII, Sections 1 and B.
(2) Under Constitution of Utah, Article IV. Sections 2 and 8, the provision for election with-

out secret ballot by the city electors is unconsti-tutional and void.
The above matters are all part of the same proposition, and it is felt they can best be considered together.
Under the provisions of the Constitution of Utah,
Article VIII, Sections 1 and 8, the office of justice of
the peace is created as a constitutional elective office.
It is a general rule followed in Utah that a.n office which
ha.s been pr'Ovided for by the Constitution may not be
abolished by an act of the Legislature. See
30
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6·7 l---;.J.S., Page 121,
Note 49.
See also the annotation in
4 A.L.R.. 205,

supplemented by the annotation in
172 .A.. L.R. 1366.

See also
Leatham YS. Reger
54 Utah 491,
182 Pac. 187,
where the Utah Court says:
''No one contends that courts created by
the Constitution may be abrogated by Legislative
Act.''
In that case the Supreme Court ruled that the city court
act did not attempt to. abrogate the office of justice of
the peace, but that the justice's court continued under
the city court act with each city judge made ex-officio
justice of the peace with power to discharge all the
powers and dutjes pertaining to that office. The court
commenting said :
''There is, however, still another cogent
reason \Vhy the foregoing construction of the ac.t
in question should prevail. It is this: If the construction conte·nded for by the defenda.nt1s be
adopted, then it is probable that some of the provisions of the act would conflict with one or more
proyisions of the constitution.''
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The proVIsions of the Constitution referred to were
Sections 1 and 8 of Article VIII by which the office of
justice of the peace was created as a constitutional office.
The present city court act follows that case and
philosophy. Section 104-4-4 of the Judicial Code
(Chapter 58, I_jaws of Utah, 1951) provides that:
''In cities where city eourts are established
no justice of the peace shall he elected or appointed, and the judge or judges of the city court
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the precinct, and as such shall p·erform the duties of such
office.'' (ItaliG·S added)
It must be observed that under this statute a city
judge is also, by virtue of his office, justice of the peace
for the precinct. There are two offices, but the Legislature has made it abundantly clear that a city judge
must also he, and qualify as a Justice of the Peace. This
was obviously done to insure the continuation of the
eonstitutional office of justice of the precinct, as the
Legislature recognized then than an attempt to abolish
that office would render the act void. Respondent cannot claim to he elected city judge without being also
elected justice of the peace. The first carries with it
the other. This being the case, the manner of election
to the first must conform to constitutional requirements
for election to the second.
In the case of
Love vs. Liddle
26 Utah 62,
72 Pac. 185,
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the court held that justices of the peaee of a eity precinct are precinct offieers and that they are one distinct
class of judicial officer established by the constitution.
It· must again be emphasized that. clearly under the
Constitution the justices of the peace are established
as elective officers and are so refe-rred to in Article·
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution where: it is. said that
the Legislature may determine how many justices of
the peace may be elected. All of the statutes relating
to justices of the peace provide for their eleetion. The
city court act, until the enactment of Chapter 26,
Laws of Utah, 1951, specifically provided that the city
judges and ex-officio justices of the peace should be
elected.
However, by that last piece of legislation the Legislature provided that if ony one candidate filed for
office, he should ''forthwith'' be issued a certificate
of election for the ensuing term. It is under this provision that the defendant claims to have been elected to
the office of eity court judge and ex-officio justice of
the peaee, if such offiee exists. It is to be noted that
the defendant does not claim under any of the provisions
of the law authorizing interim appointme·nts, but only
as an elected official.
It is submitted that the provisio of the law referred to is void and unconstitutional because it i·s contrary to the provisions of Article IV, Seetion 2 and
8 by which it is provided that every qualified citizen
s.hall be entitled to vote· by secret ballot at every election.
~3
i.J
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Defendant does not contend that anyone cast any secret
ballot for him or that his name was submitted to the
voters upon any official ballot for vote.
Moreover, it must be observed that the law nort only
requires that the name of a candate be submitted to
the voter~s upon a s.ecret ballot, but that a blank ticket
be provided wherein the voters may write in the name
of any candidate of their choice even though he has not
been nominated and his name printed on the ballot. See
Sections 25-11-1 as amended and Sections 25-11-3 and 256-5, as amended, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. See also
the case of
Park vs. Rives
40 Utah 47,
119 Pac. 1034,
in which Utah's non-parti~san ballot in municipal elections was attacked upon the ground that in failing to provide for a blank ticket for writing in a candidate of a
voter's choice 1t violated the provisions of Article IV,
Section 2 and 8 of the Constitution of Utah because
it impaired the franchise guaranteed by the Constitution. The court said :
"Let it he conceded that, if the act ~so restricts
and probih1ts a voter (restricts him to vote for
one or two candidia.tes named on the ballot and
prohibjts a write-in of another choice), such legislation would, as. is urged, be an improper interference with the elective franchise. 15 Cyc.
289."
The court then held that in order to bring the act into
harmony with the Constitution the provisions of the
34
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general election la"·, incorporated by reference in the
act providing for non-partisan municipal ballots, would
apply. The g·eneral la,y· requires that the ballot contain
a blank ticket ''"here any voter may vote for any person
of his choice whether or not he was nominated at the
primary.
See also
18 Am. J ur. ''Elections'',
Section 191, Page 307,
Note 9,
,,~here

it is said:
'• The majority view, however, seems to he that
a statute prohibiting the writing in of names of
candidate's upon the ballot is unconstitutional.''

See also the a1motations in
A1motated Cases, 1913D 614
and
91 American State Reports 682.

The annotation last cited contains an excellent editorial
analysis of the cases decided up to that time and of the.
reasoning behind the majority rule. It is re1spectfully
recommende·d for the court's especial attention.
It is interesting to note that very few cases seem
to have been decided on this point during the last twenty
or thirty year8. Apparently most legiStlatures, sensitive to the sacredne·ss of the franchise, have regarded
35
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the matter a.s settled and have not attempted to disenfranchise the citizens as to an elective office as the
Legislwture of Utah, apparently without sufficient consideration, attempted to do in the last quoted provision
of the City Court Judicial Selection Bill.
It is common· knowledge that electors not infrequently elect write-in candidates. The write-in franchise and privilege is a very real and important one
in our :borm of government. The Eisenhower vote in .
the recent Republican primaries illustrates the possibilities.
It has been suggested that this court's decision in
Rich vs. Industrial Commission
80 U ta.h 511 ; 15 Pac. 2nd 641,
by implication holds that nowtwithstanding the city
eourt statute providing that the city judge is ex-officio
justice of the peace, they are separable and rthat the respondent lawfully holds the office of city judge even
though he is not legally elected as a justice of the peace.
It is submitted that this is not the case. The decision
referred to was made under a special statute relating to
the duties of constable in the city precinct and was concerned only with the problem of whether the constable or
the sheriff was the officer required by law to serve process from the city court. It was held that under the peculiar statute in question (Section 19-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) the constable was required to serve process from justice's courts but only permitted, though
not required, to serve process from city courts. This,
36
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of course~ has nothing to do \Yith 'Whether or not the presiding offices in the t"'"o courts are merg·ed in one man as
above outlined. The ease is not in point. Neither is there
any analogy to be dra"11 therefrom.
It seems very clear from the authorities mentioned
that the provision of the statute under which the defendant claims the offiee of judge of the Second Department
of the Ogden City Court and ex-officio justice of the·
peace for Ogden Precinct is uncontitutional and void
and defendant eannot claim or acquire any rights whatsoever thereunder. The provision that a cadidate shall
be elected to an elective office hy the mere process of
filing his uncontested candidacy and without ever having been submitted to the voters upon a secret ballot
with provision for a write-in opp.osition candidate, is
unconstitutional and void. Out of that void statute no
rights can accrue to the defendant and he cannot claim
election to the office if it exists, by virtue of an unconstitutional procedure. Even if the office exists, the defendant is not legally elected thereto and should not he
permitted to attempt to discharge the power and duties
incident to the office. The judgment and declaration
of the court should be entered accordingly.

B. The office of judge of a city court is an elective
office and the defendant, not ha.ving been elected
thereto by secret ballot of the electors, has no
valid claim to S'UC'h office.
This argument needs little elaboration. By Section
104-4-2 of the Judicial Code, as amended, it is provided
that city judges ''shall be elected by the qualified electors of their respee;tive ·cities.'' This, of course, 1s 111
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accordanc.e with practice and tradition in a free republic
and eonfirms to constitutional requirements. The provision that an unopposed cadida.te shall be issued a certific.ate of election without being placed on the ballot,
is, of course, diametrically opposed to the provision
quoted. It is not possible to reconcile them. One or the
other must fall.
Under these circumstanees the one which violrutes
the constitution and the tradition of government should
and must give away, and it should he held that no one
ma.y be ''elected'' to the office of city judge, except by
the eleetors in the secret ballot at a r·egularly called
free elecrtion.
The case of Park vs. Rives, supra, points the way.
As there it was held that a blank space must be provided
on the ballot, even though not required hy the particular statute, so here it should be held that even an unopposed condidate must be submitted to the voters on a
secret ballot with a blank ticket provided for ''writein" candidates.
As the respondent here was not elected by the electors by any ballot, he is not legally elected and has no
right to the offic.e of Judge of Department No. Two of
the Ogden City Court, if that office does exist.
C.

Defendant has no valid cla.im to the office of
judge of the city court as by an appoi,ntment.

(1)

The filing of an unopposed declaration and
petition for candidacy for such office cannot
be deemed a valid appointm.ent thereto, as new
Section 1 of the Judicial Code as enacted by

38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section ~' Chapter ~G, Laws of Utah, 1951, is
voi.d for V'iolation of the Constitution of Utah,
Article lr, Section 1, and Article VI, Section 29.
It 'Yas suggested in the court below tha1t as the
office of judg·e of a. city court is one ereated by the Legislature, the Legislature has power to provide for the
appointment of the city judge hy any method it deems
proper, and that the provision of the statute for the
issuance of a certificate of election when it is made to
appear that a candidate is unopposed, is the legal equiv~lent of an appointment by the candidate and his one
hundred supporting petitioners and the city reeorde·r.
There are two reasons why this eannot be the ease.
First, as hereinbefore demonstrated, the office of
city judg·e carries with it ex-officio the offiee of justice
of the peace which is an elective constitutional office
not subject to appointment in this manner.
Second, the Legislature under our Utah Constitution has no authority to authorize an unoffieial private
association of citizens to a publiic municipal offiee. Any
statue which attempts to grant s-q.ch a right and privilege is unconstitutional and void for violation of
Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 29 of the
Constitution of Utah.
The first section of the Constitution referred to vests
all of the powers of government of the State of Utah
in three departments, the Legislative, the Eocecutive and
the Judicial. No exceptions are made. The p·eople by
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their Constitution have delegated all powers of govern. .
ment to the state and the Legislature may not re-delegate
any gove-rnmental function to any p·rivate person or
association of persons.
The whole theory of the Republican form of govern. .
ment, which is guaranteed to the State of Utah by the
Federal Constitution, is that government powers shall
he exer:eis.ed only by publie officers duly selected to represent the sovereign people. "While it is recognized
that public offices can be created and filled by appointment, it is fundamental that no per~son may exercise
the sovereign power of filling a public office except by
election by secret ballot as provided in the Constitution,
or through appointment hy a public officer or public body
to whom the people have delegated that official power
and authority. The public officers may not redelegate
that sovereign power to any private person or association of persons. To permit them so to do would be to
authorize them entjrely to abrogate their own functions and duties and to appoint a dictator for the state.
This they cannot do.
The Constitution of Utah is specific on this point
as regards municipal functions. Section 29 of Article
VI provides that ''the Legislature shall not delegateto any special commission, private eorporation or association, any power .... to perform any municipal functions.'' It is obvious thrut the selection of a city judge
to administer a city c.ourt having exclusive jurisdiction of criminal actions under city ordinances and who
is a city officer paid out of the city tre·asury is a municipal funetion. It is equally obvious that the Legis-
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lature eannot delegate this function to any self-appointed
"private assoriation" of one hundred electors, responsible to no one but to themselves and a~ssociated on their
own motion only for the purpose of selecting a judge.
This is exactly "That the statute in question attempts
to do. It clearly violates the expre~ss prohibition of the
Constitution and is void.
If it should be argued that it is the city recorder
who issues the certificate of ''election,'' and that the
city recorder is a p11blic officer, it need only be observed
by way of answer that the city recorder under the statute has no discretion but is required by the statute as
a ministerial act to issue the certificate if the candidate
is unopposed. Thus the act is not the recorde-r's but
is the act of the candidate and his one hundred petitioners. That argument can avail the respondent nothing.
This conclusion is supported by well reasoned cases
from other jurisdictions and by a decision of the Supreme Court of Utah.
In the case of
Tucker vs. State (Indiana, 1941)
35 N. E. 2nd 270, 301, et seq.,
it was held that while the legislature might create new
offices and provide for the selection of officers to operate them, it has no power or discretion to vest a part of
the sovereign power in some agency outside the government as set up and established by the Constitution, and
that power of appointment to public office is a sovereign
power which cannot he dele~g--ated to any private agency.

41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Indeed the Indiana eourt indicated that under the constitutional division of power the legislature could not appoint an offieer to an exeeutive or judicial position and
that exeept as expressly authorized by the Constitution
the executive could not be authorized to appoint to a
judicial or legislative position, etc. However, it is not
necesssary to go this far to sustain the position of Ogden
City in this case.
And in the case of
State vs. Schorr (Delaware, 1948)
65 Atl. 2nd 810,
it appeared that the legislature had created a county
department of elections, and provided that five members should be nominated by the chairman of each of
the two leading political parties. These parties were
held not to be state agencies or connected with the state
government, but were only voluntary associations of
individuals. The statute further made it mandatory
that the governor appoint the nominees of the respective
political parties. This provision the court very properly considered to be a vesting of the power of appointment in the. party chairman. The governor's position
there was exartly that of the c1ity recorder in the case
at bar.
The Delaware Court held that:
''. . . . the legislature cannot delegate to the
State Chairman of a political party, which is a
voluntary organization of individuals, accountable to no one except its own organization, having no connection with the three branches of government in which the sovereign power of Government is lodged by the Constitution, the power to
42
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appoint the members of a. state agency ... Rice
v. Foster, -! Hav. -!79; Rouse Y. Thompson, 228
Ill. 52~, 81 N. E. 1109; People ex rei. Shumway
vs. Benn2.tt, 29 ~Iich. 4:51, 18 Am. Rep. 107; State
ex inf. Hadley v. \Vashbury, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W.
592, 90 Am. St. Rep·. 430; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v.
Todd, 91 Ky. 175, 15 S. W. 56; Winters v. Hughes,
3 Utah 443, 24 P. 759."
This case seems to be exactly in point.
Then the lTtah case of
\\~inters

vs. Hughes
3 Utah 443,
24 Pac. 759,
although not exactly in point, is exactly analogous. The
problem involved in that case develop·ed when the Legislature passed an act directing that on p·etition of one
hundred voters in any judicial district, the judge should
hold a special session of court at the time and place
specified in the petition. This court held that the legislative act was void as an attempted, unlawful delegation of governmental legislative power conferred by
the organic act on the legislature and the governor,
which provided that courts should be held at times and
places "prescribed by law." This court there pointed
out that if the power to delegate to any one hundred
petitioning citizens the authority to determine where
and when sessions of court are to be held, a single individual may equally be vested with such power by legislative act, ''and the strange spectacle would be presented
of courts, officers and suitors becoming subject to the
caprice of one man. '' In other words if any sovereign
governmental function can be delegated to a private in43
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dividual or association, then all such governmental functions can be so delegated, and our Republican form GoveTnment could be swallowed up by a dictatorship. This
certainly is eontrary to our theory of government as set
up in our Constitution. The very idea is repugnant
to Americans and violative of the clear intent and express
provisions of the Constitution of Utah.
It is submitted that the respondent here cannot validly claim the office of city judge as by an appointment
through the procedure followed.
(2)

Such r,ffice can be filled in the first instance
only by appointment by the Ma.yor with the consent of the City Council, and defendant holds no
such appointment.

Even if it were to be conceded that the office of
judge of a. city court can be filled by appointment, the
appointing po,ver is by the terms of the statute itself
vested exclusively in the Mayor of the city acting with
the consent of the governing body.
By Section 104-4-3 of the Judicial Code as amended
hy Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, when a city has
entered a class entitled to have an additional judge, the
Mayor is authorized to appoint one.
On the other hand the new Section 1 of the Judicial
Code as enacted by said Chapter 26 provides for the
nomination and ''election'' of a judge of a city court
only '' al the expiration of the term of a judge of a city
court." (Italics supplied). In such event the judicial
candidate may fill his declaration of candidacy with a
supporting petition of qualified voters. No provision
44
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is made for the election of a judge exeept to fill the vacancy ereated by the expiration of the term of one
already in office.
It is obvious from a reading of the various proYisions of the statutes in pari materia, as required by
the rules of construction, that the Legislature intended
that a ne"\v office of ei ty judge should be filled in the
first instance only by appointment by the Mayor. At
the termination of his term he would be the incumbent
retiring, and both he and other candidates could then
aspire to election for the second and succeeding te·rms
of the new office.
It is also interesting to note from the title of Chapter 26 as well as from the body of the statute that it is
intended thereby to provide a non-partisan method of
selecting judges of the city courts. We think the court
will take judicial notice of the history of the movement
for non-partisan selection of the judiciary. It is to he
recalled that the Legislature first proposed a constitutional amendment to the se-ctions of the Constitution
which required the elec.tion of Supreme Court Justices
and Judges of the District Courts-but made no such
proposal as to the se-ction referring to the election of
Justices of the Peace. The people ratified this proposal
and the legislatures for the past several sessions have
been concerned with the implementation of the constitutional amendmets. Chapter 26 apparently was primarily concerned with bringing the eity eourt into harmony with the legislation adopted at the same session
for district and su·preme court justiees.
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The philosophy of the· act as disclosed by the provision that incumbents shall have a definite advantage
is to obtain and retain in the judiciary judges of adequate training and experience. Other acts passed by
previous legislatures but vetoed by the governor provided for appointment of distriet and supreme court
justices in a·ccordance with the new philosophy as to
judicial selection. Apparently the Legislature considered that responsible· public officers would be more
likely to select a man who was good judicial timber than
would the general population in an election where partisan politics and the "vote getting" personalities of
the several candidates would obscure the real issue
of judicial qualification,
Considering the words used and the purpose of
establishing an improved non-partisan method for selecting the judiciary, it seems clear that the Legislature
intended the fj rs.t incumbent in office should be appointed by the Mayor. If the office in question exists,
the current term is the first term thereof so that the
only way defendant eould lawfully claim that office
would be by appointment from the Mayor. He makes
no elaim to such appointment. He has no right to the
office even under the terms of the statute under which
he claims.
GENERAL OBSERVATION ON THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
Perhaps it is not improper in the light of the public
interest involved to observe that the decision here sought
by Ogden City \vill not cause difficulty or confusion in
the city courts of other cities in the state. The number
46
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of judges serYing in other city c.ourts \vas not changed
by the amendment to the statute so that there is no question in other cities as to the number of judges. As to
the election procedure, it appears that all other judges
of city courts "\Yho receive certificates of eleetion without being voted upon were the incumbents during a
previous term, so that if their present certificates of
election are invalid for the reasons herein discussed,
nevertheless ~he judges in question lawfully continue
to hold their repective offices beeause their respective
successors have not yet been elected and qualified.
CONCLUSION
Upon the facts and authorities hereinbefore discussed it is respectfully submitted, first, that the office
to which respondent aspires does not exist in law, and
secondly, that even if such office exists, the defendant
has not been legally elected or appointed thereto. ·The
judgment of the lower court should be reversed and
the lower court should be directed to enter judgment
in favor of appellant as prayed in its complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHE:R
Corporation Counsel of
·Ogden City
Attorney for Appellant
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